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SOME PRACTICES OF 
THEOLOGICAL 
REASONING, OR, HOW TO 
WORK WELL WITH WORDS 
Brad ]. Kallenberg 
If anyone is in Christ, it's a whole new world. 
(St Paul, 2 Cor. 5:17) 
I used to enjoy going on very long runs . Over the years I encountered a surprisingly 
wide range of animals as I ran: bobcat, eagle, osprey, armadillo, crocodile, wild 
turkey, owl, coyote, rattlesnake, tarantula, deer, and falcon. Twice I met a bear. But 
the strangest encounter of all happened on a fire road in the foothills of the San 
Bernardino Mountains. Coming round the corner I was suddenly faced with a wan-
dering flock of sheep - in urban Southern California! I had never met sheep before 
and wondered what they would make of me. They were largely unconcerned. 
Philosopher and theologian Herbert McCabe asks us to consider the similarities 
and the differences between the 'world' of sheep and the 'world' of human beings by 
comparing our respective responses to the presence of a predator, say a wolf. 1 As far 
as a sheep is concerned, a wolf is dangerous. As far as a human, alone in the wild, is 
concerned a wolf is also dangerous. 'Danger' is the meaning that the wolf presents to 
both the sheep and the runner. Because we share this meaning, both the sheep and I 
would react in similar ways: pulse quickens, nostrils flare, eyes widen and we both 
flee to avoid the danger posed by the wolf. When we run, we can both be said to act 
for the same reason. 
Acting for a reason is one way to describe the world of meanings shared by 
mammals. In large measure, this kind of 'world' is one that can be described from 
the outside. A biologist can describe the similarities between the sheep's perception 
of Canis lupus and the human's perception. These similar bodily responses in the 
presence of a growling wolf are part and parcel of what it means to say that the 
sheep and the human act 'for the same reason'. 
However, human beings also inhabit a 'world' of a higher order than that which 
we share with other mammals. While both the sheep and I act for a reason, unlike 
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the sheep, I, as a human, can also be said to 'have' a reason for acting. Having reasons 
means that the wolf becomes significant to humans in ways not available to the sheep. 
How a sheep reacts to danger is largely (if not entirely) determined by genetics. And 
while the human has similar genetically determined reactions, the wolf holds added 
significance to humans because humans share a linguistic world. As a speaker and reader 
of say, English, I understand that Canis lupus is one of the small number of meat eaters 
that hunts in daylight and hunts in a pack. So while both the sheep and I run for a 
reason (to escape the sharp fangs of the wolf), I do not run directly away from the 
wolf but at an odd angle because I also have a reason the sheep knows nothing about, 
namely I suspect the unseen presence of the rest of the pack. The sheep cannot con-
ceive facts from books. It can only react to what it perceives here and now. When 
the rest of the wolf pack becomes perceivable, it will be too late for the poor sheep. 
Language users share a higher-order world of meaning than animals can conceive. 
But language users, being bodily critters themselves , are able to imagine something 
of what it is like to be a sheep. In fact, in an important sense, human beings can only 
inhabit this higher-order world of meaning because we are critters who already inhabit 
the lower-order world of bodies. Now consider: St Paul says that 'if anyone is in 
Christ: it is a whole new world!' Taken at face value, Paul seems to be saying that 
there may be an even higher-order world of meaning that eclipses both linguistic and 
animal worlds and yet remains somehow entangled with them. These interconnec-
tions give warrant to one theologian's rough and ready definition of theology as 'the 
task of working with words in the light of faith'. 2 
Working with words 
Our language contains a variety of 'tools' for getting things done ('Shut the door!' 
'Will you marry me?' 'I christen thee John.' 'Did you hear the joke about ... '). 3 And 
the tools themselves are of our making. I do not mean that you or I make up words , 
but rather that all language speakers, over these many, many centuries, have in the 
ongoing acts of speaking molded the means by which we communicate. This fact 
sets us apart: Animals communicate by means that are genetically determined; 
humans communicate in media of their own making.4 
Because speaking and being human are deeply intertwined, it is easy to overlook 
how deeply ingressed language is in us and we in language. Consider an easy word 
such as 'chair'. Speakers of English know what 'chair' means and show that they do 
know by using the word appropriately on all the right occasions. This we do without 
any effort. Conversely, fluency with 'chair' also results in our effortlessly not using 
the word on all the wrong occasions. So, we do not use the word 'chair' when talk-
ing about the smell of cheese or the direction of inflation or the imminence of rain. 
In fact, there are countless ways we do not use the word 'chair' and innumerable 
ways that we do. How in the world do we keep them straight and manage to do so 
without paying attention? Part of the answer may be uncovered by watching the way 
young children learn to speak. 
Children begin speaking about the same time they become mobile. First they roll, 
then they skootch, next comes the army crawl and then ... they're off! In no time 
they are pulling themselves into standing position and hand-over-hand shuffling from 
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one piece of furniture to another until they make it over to wherever Mom or Dad 
is sitting. The child reaches and grunts, 'Unnnhhh', and the parent scoops her up. 
No sooner is the child seated than she slides off the lap. This becomes a fun game, 
up, down, up, down, ad infinitum. Most young parents assist the child in the game 
somewhat absent-mindedly while carrying on full-blown conversations with other 
adults . 
This game is one of the child's first encounters with chairs. The encounter itself is 
part of the child's fluency: chairs are what we climb into, slide off from, sit in, 
bounce on, crawl around, spill food on, lose crayons under, and bump into. Eventually, 
the child will learn to count chairs, stack chairs, knock over chairs, drag chairs, and 
so on. These bodily activities comprise the familiar home in which the word 'chair' 
most often appears. How we speak of chairs - that is the pattern of regularities of 
our use of the word - is bound up with all these familiar activities. This is what 
philosopher of language Ludwig Wittgenstein meant when he said that it belongs to 
the grammar of 'chair' that we do things with them, especially that we sit in them.5 
We can imagine a non-English speaker learning the English word 'chair' by simple 
substitution. If from France, the speaker will learn that 'chair' is synonymous with 
chaise. If from Germany, Stuhl. But how does someone learn the word whose host 
culture has no chairs (perhaps they only squat on their haunches)? To learn a brand 
new concept requires participation in the form of life that involves chairs. For the 
outsider, this involves both becoming familiar with the regular ways that the host 
'tribe' uses a given word, which for speakers of English will include (1) all the sen-
tences that use the word 'chairs' as well as (2) all the activities involving chairs: 
counting, stacking, fetching, stubbing toes on, and so on. Only when familiar with 
everyday activities with chairs will the non-native speaker acquire enough fluency to 
'bicker with the natives like a brother'. 6 
This complicated form of life 
Ordinary words are connected with our bodies in surprisingly deep and involved 
ways. In the case of 'chair', the meaning is bound up with what we do both with the 
chairs and with the word 'chair'. But how is this unique to the human animal? After 
all, cannot Koko the chimp, as well as many family dogs, work with words? Cer-
tainly. But this isn't very high praise for Koko or Rover since only in the most 
simple of cases do our vocables simply go proxy for things that can be detected by 
means of animal senses. In fact, the vast majority of human talking does not relate to 
a world-of-meanings that an animal could share. That does not mean that our talking 
is meaningless per se, only that it is meaningless to animals. 
Consider how a very young child learns the word 'God'. A clue to their learning 
comes from noticing the sorts of occasions in which the word 'God' is familiarly 
spoken. If the child is asked to define God, he or she will likely say things such as 
'We sing songs to God', 'God is the one we pray to', 'We tell God about what we 
did wrong', 'We visit God on Sundays', or 'We tell our friends about God'. For the 
child, the concept of God cannot be separated from all the bodily activities in which 
the word is used: praying, worshiping, confessing, thanking, singing, evangelizing, 
and so on.7 
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The intimate connection between bodies and words is the linchpin for under-
standing what theologians do all day. Theologians do not pull words out of thin air 
and rearrange them until they sound pleasing. Theologians undertake the most sig-
nificant conversations possible and do so under the most restrictive conditions 
imaginable. Some of these 'restrictions' are self-imposed.8 The theologian operates 
under the canonical text and in step with the Spirit who is moving the Church 
through history.9 And what tools are available to the theologian working under such 
restrictions? Words, words connected to bodies. 
In what follows I will sketch scenes from the history of theological reasoning in 
order to illustrate five kinds of practices that theologians are able to perform because 
words are connected with bodies. It all begins with a revolution. 
A whole new world 
There is a big difference between reform and revolution. 10 Both reformers and 
revolutionaries see problems in society that need fixing. The reformer can propose 
changes that make perfect sense: the proposed changes sound good to everyone 
because everyone already agrees what 'good' means. The revolutionary faces a more 
difficult task because the heart of the revolution is the revolutionary's conviction 
that everybody has got the meaning of 'good' all wrong. As a result, the changes 
proposed by the revolutionary may not sound very appealing, precisely because they 
will upend central aspects of what is currently held as decent, important, and bene-
ficial. What the revolutionary proposes may in fact be good - but calling the changes 
'good' will not make sense until after the revolution. Revolutionary good cannot be 
anticipated in advance; it is a new kind of good. 
Jesus was a revolutionary. His message was Gospel or 'good news' - but the 
goodness of the news is only intelligible when viewed from the far side of his revo-
lution. Prior to his life, ministry, death, burial, resurrection and sending of his 
Spirit, Jesus' words were often mystifying and therefore misunderstood even by his 
disciples. 11 In other words, prior to the revolution, listening to Jesus was for the 
disciples like working on a jigsaw puzzle while studying the wrong box top. 12 Sub-
sequent to the revolution, which is to say after the Spirit gives birth to the Church, 
the wrong box top is wrested out of their hands. For them it was, as Paul says, 'a whole 
new world', one that required Christ-followers to figure out how to live lives faithful 
to the revolution. Here then is a short definition: Theology is the ongoing, some-
times heated, conversation about what does and does not fit the revolution. While 
no exhaustive account of the practices of theological reasoning is possible, different 
aspects of the theological task come to the fore at different moments of theological 
history. The first aspect is theology-as-witness. 
Theology-as-witness 
In Western society, giving witness in a court of law seems straightforward: using 
words that jurors understand ('speeding', 'reckless', 'running a stoplight'), the wit-
ness describes a series of events, events that are just the sort with which the jurors 
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are already familiar (e.g. car crashes). But giving testimony is not always straightfor-
ward, especially when the events or the vocabulary are unfamiliar to the hearers. 
This difficulty can be seen by comparing what a Jewish audience was able to 'hear' to 
what a Gentile audience could 'hear'. When Peter proclaims to an audience of Jews 
(gathered from across the Empire for the Feast of Booths) that Jesus was raised from 
the dead, they barely blink an eye. But when Paul tells the same story to a non-
Jewish crowd, a sizeable majority shake their heads in confusion while others sneer 
at the ridiculous idea of resurrection. 13 In both Jewish and Gentile worlds, dead 
people ordinarily do not return from the dead sporting a body that eats solid food 
but walks through locked doors. Yet Jewish literature had, over a period of several 
centuries, slowly acquired the concept of 'resurrection'. Beginning with the idea of 
the extremely rare and miraculous resuscitation of a recently dead person (one who 
would ultimately die again), 14 the concept of 'raised' slowly morphs over time until 
Jews could speak about a universal, albeit distantly future, revivification of all per-
sons before God-the-Judge. 15 Thus to the Jewish mind Peter's statement about a 
dead man being raised was intelligible; if this man Jesus was raised from the dead, it 
would signal the beginning of the End foretold by the prophets, which is to say, the 
distant future begins now. And 3,000 Jews converted. 
But now consider what lengths Paul, 'Apostle to the Gentiles', must go to when 
addressing a non-Jewish audience. To begin with, Paul carefully aligns bodily deeds with 
the revolutionary message. For example, Paul urges the Thessalonians to remember 
'what sort of men we proved to be among you for your sake' .16 Similarly, Paul 
explains to the Corinthians that what ratifies his message is not his rhetorical skill 
but rather the manner in which Paul and his companions behaved. 17 The striking 
manner of Paul's daily conduct is epitomized during the last leg of his third mis-
sionary journey. While passing through Caesarea Philippi, a Christian prophet 
named Agabus foretold the arrest and imprisonment awaiting Paul in Jerusalem.18 
Assuming Agabus's prediction is reliable, how might we have expected Paul to 
respond? It seems eminently reasonable that Paul would have taken evasive action, 
like he did in the incident with the basket over the wall, 19 so as to extend the years 
in which he could minister. But on this particular occasion he refuses to deviate 
from completing the journey where he started: Jerusalem. Why? The answer seems 
mundane. Paul's trip had been a fund-raiser for the impoverished Jewish Christians, 
unemployed because of local persecution around Jerusalem. While it seems reason-
able to hand off the money sack to a trusted companion with a lower profile, Paul 
insists on delivering the collection himself. Why was he so stubborn on this point? 
Apparently, Paul sees a crucial connection between the content of his message and 
this particular bodily deed. His gospel is not 'in words only', 20 but in words that 
become intelligible against the backdrop of deeds . His conduct displays his message. 
Paul must go to Jerusalem, because the revolutionary good news he bears is intern-
ally connected to caring for the poor. 21 If he surrenders this deed, his message 
becomes that much less intelligible. 
Paul's action is an instance of theology-as-witness. To say the same thing differ-
ently, one practice of theological reasoning is the intentional alignment of deeds and 
words in order to properly convey a revolutionary message. This tactic is carried 
forward by each successive generation of Christians, 22 and especially by theologians 
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who are surrounded by ignorance and misunderstanding. Notice the length to which 
second-century apologist Aristides goes to set out the grammar of 'God': 
But the Christians ... show kindness to those near them; and whenever they 
are judges, they judge uprightly .... they do good to their enemies .... if one 
or other of them [has] bondsmen and bondswomen or children, through 
love towards them they persuade them to become Christians, and when 
they have done so, they call them brethren without distinction. They do not 
worship strange gods, and they go their way in all modesty and cheerfulness. 
Falsehood is not found among them; and they love one another ... And he, 
who has , gives to him who has not, without boasting. And when they see a 
stranger, they take him in to their own homes and rejoice over him as a very 
brother . . . And if they hear that one of their number is imprisoned or 
afflicted on account of the name of their Messiah, all of them anxiously 
minister to his necessity ... And if there is any among them that is poor and 
needy, and they have no spare food, they fast two or three days in order to 
supply to the needy their lack of food .... 
Such, 0 King ... is their manner of life .... And verily, this is a new 
people, and there is something divine in the midst of them.B 
Aristides is well aware that his polytheistic audience comes to the table with crippling 
misconceptions about what the word 'god/s' means. So he sets out what Christians mean 
by devoting several pages to describing the amazing manner in which Christians live. 
Such examples of 'embodied' apologetics can be multiplied. The point for us is 
that an important aspect of theological reasoning is theology-as-witness by which the 
theologian seeks the alignment of deeds and words in service of the message. How 
must Vwe live? The answer is that Vwe ought to live in such a manner that our lives 
become what sociologists call a 'plausibility structure' for the Gospel. 24 
Theology-as-politics 
If theology-as-witness seeks attunement between deeds and words in service of 
bringing comprehension to those outside the revolution, theology-as-politics strives 
for attunement between language and behaviors for the sake of those inside the 
believing community. Here the word 'politics' refers not to the combative rhetoric 
of an election year. Rather, the idea grows out of the Greek noun for community, 
polis, and the verb form, politeuomai, which connotes the art of community formation. 
The later term involves the corporate character that arises from the coordinated 
interplay of everyone's individual behaviors. Thus Paul writes to the congregation 
in Philippi, 'only conduct yourselves [politeuomai, literally "coordinate y'all's life 
together"] in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ' . 25 
Sometimes community life needs only a little tweaking. In these instances, the 
theological task can seem straightforward, as when Paul calls out Euodia and Syntyche 
by name and tells them, in no uncertain terms, to get along! 26 On other occasions 
things are more complex, and restructuring the community life involves the entire 
community in protracted discussion before any restructuring begins. In hindsight, 
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the decision to let Gentiles into the Church without also requiring them to adopt 
Jewish ways seems like just the sort of thing Jesus had in mind in his John 17 prayer. 
But at the time, the decision recorded in Acts 15 was as dicey as it was hard won. 
A powerful illustration of theology-as-politics comes from one congregation's 
response to food shortage in the fourth century.27 In the year 369 CE, the region 
surrounding the town of Caesarea [Turkey) - 100 miles from anywhere- was deva-
stated by famine. An extremely dry winter was followed by a spring without rain. 
The local pastor of the church in Caesarea, a man named Basil (one of the three famous 
'Cappadocian Fathers') reported that the sky - 'shut up, naked and cloudless' - has left 
the fields 'little more than withered clods, unpleasant, sterile, and unfruitful, cracked 
and pierced to the depths by the hot sun'.28 The hot spring and summer was 
followed by another tough winter that made travel from the land-locked town phy-
sically impossible. Those who could afford to do so began hoarding grain, while the 
commoners became 'walking cadavers' as they slowly starved. 
Today people are hardened to the horrors of death by starvation because the 
images are shown so frequently on television. But imagine being a pastor whose job 
it is to care for these walking cadavers and their swollen-bellied children. There is 
evidence that the poor were desperate enough to sell their own children as slaves to 
the rich, thus ensuring nutrition for the child as well as food for the rest of the 
family for a few more weeks. For their part, the rich had the gall to haggle over the 
purchase price even though their own act of hoarding grain was making the scarcity 
problem worse.29 It was under these conditions that Basil went to work. 
The son of a nobleman and therefore at one time independently wealthy, Basil 
cashed in his own inheritance, bought grain from the hoarders and set up a famine relief 
center on what used to be the family's summer estate. He organized soup kitchens, built 
dormitories, constructed a hospital - one of the first, if not the very first, mercy 
hospitals on record - and hired bona fide physicians and nurses to attend the sick. 
Basil's ptochotropheion (literally, 'Patron House for the Poor') was large enough to create 
a small economy of its own, enabling the poor as they recovered first to be trained 
and then actually to serve in various trades. 30 This ptochotropheion was the first of 
several. The sheer scale of these complexes earned them the nickname Basil's Cities. 
Basil's activities during this period encompassed a variety of reasoning practices. 
As we shall see below, Basil was one of the contributors to the doctrine of the Trinity 
that would be made official in 381 CE. So, obviously Basil excelled at theoretical 
reasoning. As a pastor/ethicist Basil engaged in practical reasoning classically under-
stood - especially in his homilies, letters, conversations and other verbal strategies 
he employed to persuade the rich to donate foodstuffs. But also at every turn, Basil 
was engaged in a distinct sort of practical reasoning called design.31 Design involves 
deriving satisfactory responses to problems whose answer cannot simply be 'Goo-
gled' by linking 'right means' to 'right aims'. Placement of buildings, layout of each 
building (whether dormitory or hospital or kitchen), logistics of food acquisition and 
distribution, procurement of doctors and medicines, organizing day to day care for 
the sick as well as a jobs-training program as each recovered were all instances of 
'right means'. Nothing surprising in this list. The surprise comes under 'right aim'. 
Basil's city had Christ as its aim. What does it mean for design reasoning to have 
Christ as its 'aim'? 
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When Jesus announced to the skeptics 'The kingdom of God is in your midst' ,32 
he was referring to himself as the first-order instantiation of the new kind of human 
friendship that he was inaugurating. At that moment, Jesus was the kingdom; later 
there were a dozen, then 500, then 3,000, and so on.33 It is not an accident that 
Basil's ptochotropheion was apparently nicknamed basileia (Basil's City) because the 
New Testament phrase for kingdom of God was basileia theou. When Christians 
pray the 'Lord's Prayer' , they ask for God's kingdom (basileia) to come in the same 
breath that they ask God to provide bread. In Basil's mind, Jesus' kingdom shows 
up when bread is provided to the poor of God. Thus, Basil's City was christomorphic, 
which is to say shaped like Christ's kingdom. 
Basil's city was christomorphic not only by reason of its mechanical functioning 
(famine relief) but also by reason of its physical location. Ancient Jewish Law 
required lepers to live 'outside the city'. 34 That's why Jesus met and healed the ten 
lepers outside the city wall. 35 Because Jesus befriended the sick and unclean 'outside 
the city', that is where the author of Hebrews tells us we should go too. 36 'Outside 
the city' is where Christ can always be found. Christ went outside the city to suffer 
and die for the people. And that is the logic behind Basil's intention to build his 
complexes outside the walled enclaves of the wealthy and often stingy city-dwellers. 
Like Christ, Basil's complexes made all the difference for the poorest of the poor. 
Rather than being objects of pity, because of Basil's theology-as-politics the poor 
were blessed: 'Blessed are you poor (ptochoi), for yours is the kingdom (basiliea) of 
God.'37 By both function and placement, Basil's theological project was community 
formation of the most revolutionary kind. 
Theology-as-conversation 
Theology-as-conversation is not something entirely distinct from theology-as-witness 
or theology-as-politics but rather an aspect of both. In the present age of blogging 
and texting and tweeting, words seem to have suffered devaluing by inflation. However, 
for the theologian, words are precious. We've already seen how deeply connected 
words are with bodily life. Sometimes our bodily living together actually effects a 
change in the meaning of the words we use. It is the theologian's task to work out 
the implications of these changes by means of ongoing conversations. 
I mentioned above that the predominately Jewish early church restructured 
common life to include non-Jews. Any non-Jew was welcome who joined in activities 
such as the prayerful worshiping of Jesus as God38 and recounting the Good News 
about Jesus and the reciting of the Shema: 'Hear, 0 Israel! The LORD is our God, 
the LORD is one!'39 
If we understand 'recounting the Good News' to include telling stories like Jesus' 
prayer in Gethsemane, then the three activities (1) praying to Jesus as God, (2) retelling 
the story of Jesus' own prayers, and (3) recitation of the oneness of YHWH, con-
stitute a theological headache! It would seem easy to keep any two of the three: 
(a) one could worship Jesus as God and confess that Jesus himself prayed, so long as 
one admitted a plurality of gods (for no one prays to oneself!); or (b) one could 
worship Jesus as the one God, but abandon the notion that Jesus himself prayed;40 
or (c) one could recount tales of Jesus' own prayer life and recite the singularity of 
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God but thereby infer that Jesus himself must hold a rank somewhat lower than 
full-fledged divinity. 
Most early Christian congregations refused to surrender any of these three practices 
because together the three activities constituted their identity as Christ-followers 
(an identity for which many willingly died). These three practices are evident in the 
opening pages of Acts; the conceptual tension between them was not noticed until 
some time later. Over the first three centuries of the Church, believers tried to 
'settle' things by 'rearranging the tracks' (to borrow Mike Higton's image from 
chapter 2). And I'llleave it to the reader to ferret out all the details of the drama as it 
finally came to a head in the fourth century. However, a couple of details about the 
manner of the 'settling' will shed light on the practice of theological reasoning. 
There is a huge conceptual difference between the 'settlement' known as the 
Nicene Creed (325 CE) and the one that was adopted at Constantinople some fifty-six 
years later (381 CE). Both have to do with the status of the Lord Jesus Christ. After 
positive assertions of what Christians believe, namely that the Lord Jesus Christ is of 
the same, identical substance (homoousia; homo + ousia = 'same substance' or con-
substantial) as God the Father, the Nicene Creed goes on to explicitly outlaw certain 
ways of saying things. 
But, those who say, Once he was not, or he was not before his generation, 
or he came to be out of nothing, or who assert that he, the Son of God, is 
of a different hypostasis or ousia, or that he is a creature, or changeable, or 
mutable, the Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes them.41 
The important point for us is the proscription against asserting 'that he, the Son of 
God, is of a different hypostasis or ousia'.41 Obviously, if the Lord Jesus Christ is of 
identical God-stuff as the Almighty Creator, he cannot be said to be of a different 
substance (ousia)! But Nicaea also prevented Christians from saying the Lord Jesus 
Christ is of a different hypostasis. But now observe: the Constantinopolitan Creed 
affirms consubstantiality (one ousia) but drops the proscription against saying Jesus 
was a different hypostasis. In other words, after 381 it was indeed orthodox to say 
both that the Lord Jesus Christ was of the same substance (ousia) and a different 
hypostasis.43 In fact, the very construction proscribed by Nicaea became normative for 
Christian doctrine after 381: one ousia, three hypostases, or roughly, 'one substance, 
three persons'.44 How did the council of Constantinople ever pull it off, this rever-
sal? 
Virtually all the heavy lifting for the semantic transformation of hypostasis was 
done, surprisingly, in a series of hand-written letters. Some of the letters are known 
by the addressee, such as 'To Ablabius'. Others are simply indicated by number, 
such as Letter 38 and Letter 236 - which tell us something about how many letters 
theologians wrote, if not also how many attempts it takes to achieve a satisfactory 
'settlement'. These letters seem to be preparatory work for longer presentations in 
group settings.45 Thus despite the strict synonymy on which Athanasius insisted 
('hypostasis is ousia and has no other meaning apart from ousia itsel£'46), Basil (or 
perhaps Basil's brother, Gregory, the authorship is uncertain) instead proposes in 
Letter 236 that the two be understood as semantically distinct. 47 
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Although this example of doctrinal development makes for thick conceptual 
weeds, it does remind us again that theology is not something done by oneself in the 
closed space between the ears. Not only were these councils triggered by years of 
intractable bodily practices of worshiping, telling and reciting, but the main players 
were themselves not social recluses: the very Basil who oversaw the construction of 
ptoclwtropheion is up to his neck in letter writing about the meaning of ousia and 
hypostasis. Nor ought we to conclude that theology is primarily a matter of inventing 
new concepts.48 Rather the point is that the best theological language evolves from 
lengthy and ongoing conversation. 
So important is conversation to theology that the practice of theological discussion 
slowly evolved its own ground rules. These ground rules enabled all parties both to 
squeeze the very most out of a discussion and to keep the conversation going. 
Thomas Aquinas' thirteenth-century work, Summa Theologica, is a good example of 
these ground rules. Each entry begins with a question followed by a concise sum-
mary of what former thinkers had said about the question. Then comes Thomas's 
own proposal, followed by a defense of the claim, and then finally his answer to the 
objections of the former voices. This style of theological conversation is called 
quaestiones disputatae (disputed questions). But its goal is not so much to explicate a 
final position (although some treat it this way) as to invite further conversation. 
Theology as working on oneself 
Human beings do not naturally run marathons or speak in front of large crowds. 
Nevertheless, humans are gifted with the sort of nature that can be trained to do 
things we ordinarily shy away from. It is in this light we may understand how some 
of the self-imposed 'excesses' of earlier Christians are integral to theological reasoning. 
Consider Anselm. Contemporary soteriology cannot move forward without first 
tackling Anselm's Cur Deus Homo? (Why the God-Man?). And philosophers of reli-
gion are still today debating the merits of Anselm's (so-called) 'ontological proof' in 
the opening pages of Proslogion. Yet many of these same scholars are often surprised 
to learn of the rigor of Anselm's self-mortification. 
Anselm himself recalls his life as a thirty-something theologian at the Bee mon-
astery.49 He writes that the years between 1063 and 1070 were marked by the study 
of Scripture and devoted friendships. But these years were also marked by halluci-
nations! How so? In addition to regular religious fasts, Anselm lived in a self-imposed 
state of semi-starvation. In addition, Anselm was perpetually sleep-deprived, because 
the only time for private meditation, writing, and prayer was in the small hours of 
the morning. Collective worship began well before sunrise and was repeated eight 
more times, the last around midnight. Semi-starvation and sleep deprivation are 
surely the biological contributors to Anselm's visions. But Anselm undertook his 
asceticism intentionally, as a training regimen for knowing God.50 Today many 
Western theologians are apt to lament Anselm's regimen, thinking that if he had 
gotten more sleep and better nutrition he would have done better theology. But 
Anselm saw his daily grind as crucial to doing theology. And his stance is in con-
tinuity with generations of Christian discipleship stretching back to the desert 
fathers. Perhaps you have heard some of the spectacular tales: one fellow lived atop 
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a small platform (one meter square, forty-five feet high) for four decades; some 
mixed ashes with their food; others lived without sunshine, beat themselves black 
and blue, or had themselves lashed to a stake in a mosquito-infested swamp. But why? 
There is a simple answer: the early Christian ascetics understood themselves to be 
martyrs-in-training. 51 In an age where Christianity was illegal ('Deny Jesus or die!'), 
these brave souls volunteered for severe training now in order not to deny Christ 
later. 
But what has this got to do with Anselm? By his day, Christianity had been the 
official religion of the Empire for at least five hundred years. Anselm's era was one 
in which popes crowned emperors rather than flee them! So why the need for self-
mortification? If Simeon the Stylite was a martyr-in-training, Anselm considered 
himself to be a theologian-in-training. Like an athlete or a musician, Anselm knew 
that excellence would come only as a function of bodily discipline. (Once again we see 
the inescapable connection between words and bodies.) · 
Nor was Anselm unique in this view. Six hundred years earlier Augustine had 
written in his commentary on Psalms that 'We ought not love fullness in this 
world. '52 The idea was that privation and pain school one to long for God single-
mindedly with one's whole body. For Anselm, it went without saying that the quality 
of one's knowledge of God was a function of the quality of one's character. And as 
character (ethos, long 'e') was the sum of one's habits (ethos, short 'e'), theologians of 
the age ordered their activities with due diligence. These examples could be multi-
plied.53 Today the notion that the quality of one's knowledge is a function of one's 
character seems ludicrous to most of us. Why is that? What happened? What sepa-
rates our thinking from that of our theological forebears? One answer, the short 
version, is that during the long eighteenth-century Enlightenment, we began to forget 
how to read the Bible canonically.54 For example, the study of the Bible seems to 
have been reduced to merely the application of historical critical methodology. 
Please do not misunderstand me. Historical criticism is enormously helpful to 
theology. 55 However, historical criticism cannot be the sum of biblical theology 
because it inverts the position of reader and text. Historical criticism asks the ques-
tion of correspondence: how well does the biblical text correspond to facts that are 
known through non-biblical sources? This strategy, in effect, places the reader over 
the text to render judgment on it. However, good theology also requires one to be 
under the text, as it were. Theology is not so much us interrogating the text on 
questions of history as it is allowing the text to interrogate us. Thus Augustine, in a 
letter to Jerome (d. 420), wrote 
it is from those books alone of the Scriptures, which are now called cano-
nical, that I have learned to pay them such honor and respect as to believe 
most firmly that not one of their authors has erred in writing anything at all. 
If I do find anything in those books which seems contrary to the truth, I 
decide that either the text is corrupt, or the translator did not follow what 
was really said, or that I failed to understand it. 56 
If these examples sound odd to our ears, we probably ought to conclude that it is we 
and not they who are the oddballs! An integral part of theological reasoning has 
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always been a planning of one's daily grind so as to achieve (eventually, hopefully) 
the kind of character capable of doing good theology. Consider this sensible piece of 
advice: if a burglar is breaking into the house, it is too late to start lifting weights! 
Anselm's example urges us to begin 'lifting weights' today. But note this: theological 
weight training is not restricted to brainwork - like learning to read your Greek New 
Testament. As much as brainwork is valuable, Anselm would have us pay close 
attention to what we do with the rest of our bodies. Even children are taught this. 
Remember the children's song, 'Frere Jacques'? Brother John is a monk who is 
dozing during prayer. 
Are you sleeping? 
Are you sleeping? 
Brother John? 
Brother John? 
Soon it will be morning, 
Soon it will be morning, 
Ding, ding, dong, 
Ding, ding, dong. 
Pre-dawn prayer (matins or lauds) was only slightly more difficult than midnight 
(compline) prayers. Nine times a day monks gathered to pray the book of Psalms. 
And because matins and compline were done in total darkness, it was not uncom-
mon for monks to have memorized the entire book of Psalms! One begins to get the 
significance of Gavin D'Costa's point that we are to do theology on our knees, per-
haps literally.57 Of course prayer is only one of the ways bodies were made adequate 
for theological reasoning. The point is this: good theology requires a working on 
oneself. 58 It is no wonder that, prior to the Enlightenment, theologians were almost 
always deemed to be saints as well as scholars. 
Theology as disclosure modeling 
Thus far I've recounted four of the (perhaps many) reasoning practices that con-
tribute to the theologian's task. Theology-as-witness is not a simple phrase-by-phrase 
same-saying, but the deliberate attempt to show, as well as to say, the Gospel by 
means of an intentional alignment of one's bodily life with the form of Jesus' narrative. 
Theology-as-politics extends that alignment from individual biography to the shape 
of a community such that together our corporate form of living becomes a plausi-
bility structure for the Gospel. Theology-as-conversation highlights the teamwork 
and interchange permeating one's work with words. 59 And theology-as-working-on-
oneself gestures to the way that decisions about one's daily grind (when to get out of 
bed, what to eat, and so on) are themselves profoundly theological decisions. In each 
of these cases, I've tried to show that bodies are connected with the words that are 
the stock and trade of theologians. We are now ready to glimpse the practice of 
theological reasoning as an instance of disclosure modeling.60 
Aquinas gives us a toehold into the notion of disclosure models in his notion of 
'analogy'. The tricky bit for us thoroughly Modern Millies to grasp is that not all 
examples of the English word 'analogy' fit under Thomas's use of analogia. For 
34 
SOME PRACTICES OF THEOLOGICAL REASONING 
600000 0 
Figure 3.1 
example, the easiest kind of analogy to understand is proportionality. In geometry, 
one says that two triangles are 'similar' if the lengths of their respective sides are 
proportional. Is this what Aquinas means by saying theological language is analogical? 
No. God is not 'similar' to us - albeit bigger, stronger, faster. 61 Aquinas, like Augustine 
before him, explicitly denies that theological language employs proportionality to 
depict what God is like.62 It would seem that Aquinas leaves theologians forever 
tongue-tied when it comes to speaking about the very object of faith, namely God. 
However, there is another way to understand analogia. If scale models can be con-
structed from 'sideways on',63 then, in contrast, theology strives for disclosure 
models by means of growth terms. Let us tackle each in turn. 
A disclosure model shows or gestures toward something that cannot be stated 
explicitly.64 For example, if a math teacher begins drawing a series of regular poly-
gons on the chalkboard: triangle, square, pentagon, and so on (see Figure 3.1), the 
student fairly quickly sees the circle as the geometric object towards which the series 
tends. But notice how this has happened: every polygon has a finite number of 
straight sides. A circle has, by definition, no straight side; in fact a circle has no 'side' 
at all! Nevertheless, the circle is truly disclosed by a series of polygons, even though 
the circle is not itself a polygon. 
The notion of growth terms trades on the fact - a fact we tend to forget - that very 
few words are merely labels. A significant percentage of words require growth of the 
speaker if the speaker is to employ them well. For example, 'love' is a growth term.65 
Teenagers imagine that they know what love is and on this thin understanding 
youngsters marry. The teenager is not wrong to use the word 'love'. But thirty years 
and many hardships later the no-longer-teenage couple will have grown into a deeper 
fluency with the word 'love'. The teenagers are right to say 'God is love'. But the 
middle-aged couple is more right, for together they read 1 John 4:8 with deeper 
understanding. It is not that the word 'love' has changed meaning over the course of 
time, but that the human speakers have grown. 
Every practice employs growth terms. Every skilled practitioner can give exam-
ples: for the engineer the motor that begins to smell is under too much 'stress'; for 
the physician a certain 'laceration' suggests a suicide attempt rather than an accident; 
for the symphony conductor the bass notes are 'too heavy', and so on. Regardless of 
the field, the presence of growth terms, as well as the tacit knowledge that growth 
terms are tied to,66 points to the undeniable fact that to speak well 'inside' of a skill-
based practice will require ongoing transformation of the speaker. Theology is no 
different. Theology done well is a self-involving, self-transforming enterprise. Theology, 
in addition to all we've seen above, is the employment of (self-demanding) growth 
terms to effect always provisional disclosure models of God. 
With the concept of growth terms we have come full circle, back to the entry 
point of this chapter: the linguistic philosophy of Fr. Herbert McCabe. We've also 
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reached a place where we can better appreciate the image of 'settling' employed by 
Mike Higton (chapter 2) to describe reasoning. Like any particular arrangement of 
the toy train tracks, a disclosure model is necessarily always provisional and context-
bound. When one discovers a piece of toy train track under the sofa, one must 
begin the 'settling' process all over again. While it is certainly the case that a 'settle-
ment' in theology may be a highly structured architectonic system, it must also be 
acknowledged that theological reasoning may also take the form of parables and 
stories. Before concluding, let me recount a disclosure model that also involves toy 
train tracks. This disclosure comes from a surprising source: Catholic novelist 
Graham Greene. 
In 1948 Graham Greene spins a tale of a conversation between two strangers plea-
santly surprised by each other's company during a long, frigid, dark December train 
ride across Britain. The unnamed narrator identifies himself as agnostic. While he has 
some sympathy for the intuition that God exists, the recent horrors of the Second 
World War drive him to declare 'intellectually I am revolted at the whole notion of 
such a God .... When you think what God - if there is a God - allows. It is not merely 
the physical agonies, but think of the corruption, even of children ... '67 His compa-
nion, David Martin, who is a religious believer (Catholic in particular), is empathetic 
but gently objects that the human view is so limited that there can be nothing like an 
explanation on these matters. The best we can do, David says, is 'catch hints', even if 
such hints 'mean nothing at all to a human being other than the man who catches them'.68 
So what is required to catch a theological hint? Hints are unlike scientific evi-
dence - objective, repeatable, universally accessible, unambiguous. Catching hints is 
more like trying to figure out another's look or read another's intentions: 'What did 
she mean by doing this? What did he mean when he said that?' In the case of God, 
David suggests, hints of God may be manifest when events turn out as human actors 
do not intend. 
As they talk, the narrator begins to suspect that his companion is one of those 
very rare persons - he has only met one other - who might be described as 'com-
pletely happy' . So his ears perk up when David begins to recount the horrifying 
childhood tale of his own near-corruption at the hands of an ugly, one-eyed baker 
named Blacker. Blacker - renowned as a free thinker, a skeptic, and an atheist -
intentionally plotted to corrupt the then ten-year-old David. The point of the scheme 
was to procure a Eucharistic wafer so that Blacker might find out for himself 'what 
your God tastes like'.69 The bait was an electric train set. 
Over a period of several days Blacker patiently cultivated David 's fondness for the 
toy. When David's fondness reached addictive proportions, Blacker made the offer: 
He said, 'You serve at Mass, don't you? It would be easy for you to get at 
one of those things. I tell you what I'll do - I'd swap this electric train set for 
one of your wafers - consecrated, mind. It's got to be consecrated.' 70 
David-the-acolyte carries the plan off flawlessly, tucking the consecrated wafer under 
his tongue and later, in secret, twists it into a bit of newspaper (pregnantly entitled The 
Universe) and stuffs it into his pocket for safekeeping. As he readies himself for bed, 
he empties his pockets and is instantly 'haunted by the presence of God on the chair'. 71 
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As night deepens, Blacker appears ominously outside David's bedroom window 
with both the promise of the train set and the threat of a straight razor - presumably 
for slitting David's throat should he back out of their bargain. 
'Give it me,' he said. 'Quick. You shall have the train in the morning.' 
I shook my head. He said 'I've got the bleeder here and the key. You'd better 
toss it down.' 
'Go away,' I said, but could hardly speak for fear. 
'I'll bleed you first and then I'll have it just the same. m 
How can a ten-year-old possibly resist the psychological duress of such emotionally 
charged bullying with clear intent to harm? If we freeze the story at this instant, 
Blacker has the upper hand. Like the Cyclops of old, this one-eyed baker was very 
clever with his hands, having made a mechanism of this boy. David was but a cog in 
a machine that inexorably cranks out intended effects. David was bound to hand over 
the prize. How could he do otherwise? The· reader winces because the outcome 
seems inevitable. Or is it? 
'I'll bleed you first and then I'll have it just the same.' 
'Oh no you won't,' I said. I went to the chair and picked it - Him - up. There 
was only one place where he was safe. I couldn't separate the Host from the 
paper. So I swallowed both. The newsprint stuck like a prune skin to the back of 
my throat ... 73 
In a flash, the inevitability of unspeakable evil is foiled. Ours is the kind of universe 
in which persons who are most susceptible become pawns of 'irresistible' evil, 
because they are least able to resist evil. Yet, incomprehensibly, it is one of the 
children who effects a transformation of evil's 'inevitable' success into utter defeat. 
So startling is the reversal that in retrospect it is evil's defeat, rather than its success, 
that seems not merely good but in some deep sense inevitable. David continues, 
Then something happened which seems to me now more terrible than his 
[Blacker's] desire to corrupt or my thoughtless act: he began to weep - the 
tears ran lopsidedly out of the one good eye and his shoulders shook. I only 
saw his face for a moment before he bent his head and strode off, the bald 
turnip head shaking, into the dark. When I think of it now, it's almost as if 
I had seen that Thing weeping for its inevitable defeat. It had tried to use me 
as a weapon, and now I had broken in its hands and it wept its hopeless 
tears through one of Blacker's eyes. 74 
It is one thing to hope that an enemy's weapon breaks before it can be used. (Thus 
the Psalmist prays that 'their sword shall enter their own heart, and their bows shall 
be broken' . 75) But sometimes people are used as weapons against others. And when 
those humans-as-weapons break for no apparent reason, and even more so when they 
are redeemed by means of their inexplicable breaking, a trace of something Wonderful 
remains for the one who can catch the hint. 
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Conclusion: On knowing when to stop talking 
In this chapter, we have examined five complementary practices of theological rea-
soning. These five are not meant to be exhaustive, nor are they well defined and self-
contained. If taken together we can see that to work well with words, the theologian 
must bear witness, envision and inhabit a politic, invite conversation, undertake a 
training regimen and construct disclosure models. Along the way I have sampled 
quotations from the enormous variety of word-workings from past theologians: ser-
mons, biblical commentaries, formal 'orations', systematic treatments (like Aquinas' 
Summa), journal articles, 'apologies', theological books, personal correspondence and 
novels. I've tried to make the case that working well with words involves all these 
genres if for no other reason than that theology is a team sport. 
I conclude with a reminder that working well with words may sometimes require 
us not to say anything at all. In our scientific age, theologians are frequently duped 
into thinking that theology is about explaining what we believe. Because our words 
are connected to our bodies, we do well always to remember that 'created beings ... 
find it impossible to speak adequately concerning things ineffable'. 76 Augustine reminds 
us that the goal of theological reasoning is not explanation. Rather the goal of 
theology, the criterion of our working well with words, is that we always and only 
speak in a manner worthy of the Gospel. 
We believe that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, maker and 
ruler of every creature, and that the 'Father' is not the 'Son', nor 'Holy 
Spirit' 'Father' or 'Son'; but a Trinity of mutually related persons, and a unity 
of equal essence. So let us attempt to understand this truth, praying that he 
who we wish to understand would help us in doing so, so that we can set 
out [in words] whatever we thus understand with such careful reverence that 
nothing unworthy is said (even if we sometimes say one thing instead of 
another) .. . . But we must never allow any error to lead us astray in such a 
way that we say something about the Trinity which relates to the creature 
rather than the Creator, or results from wild speculation.77 
And this means that, in the end, the theologian must grow until he or she knows 
when it is time to stop talking. 
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